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WHITHER LIBERTY, EQUALITY
OR LEGALITY?
SLAVERY, RACE, PROPERTY
AND THE 1787 AMERICAN CONSITUTION"
Juliet E.K Walker"
"The rise of liberty and equality in America [was] accompanied by
the rise of slavery .... To a large degree it may be said that
Americans bought their independence with slave labor."
Edmund S. Morgan1
In the history of freedom, universal recognition distinguishes
two preeminent documents produced in Revolutionary War
America One proclaimed a philosophical basis for independence;
* This paper was originally presented at the National Conference of Black Lawyers,
Conference on The Constitution and Race: A Critical Perspective, Harvard University Law
School, Sept. 11, 1987. Other papers presented at the conference may be found in 5 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 229-431 (1988).
* * Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
B.A. Roosevelt University, 1963; A.M., American History, University of Chicago, 1970; Ph.D.,
American History, University of Chicago, 1976.
1. E.S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 4-5 (1975). See J.R. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 33

(1978), who said: "It is a popular but profound error to disregard the slave population when
estimating the success with which white society solved the problems of combining economic
subsistence with representative government." Id See also J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A
NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790's (1984), for brief distinctions
between the classical republican definition of liberty and the Lockean liberal concept of
liberty. The former is political, associated with a republic under rule of law, the liberty of
secure possessions, private vested interests, and "the enjoyment of legal title to a piece of
property." Id. at 17. The latter is economic liberty "that undergirds the free enterprise system
which received its political framework in America with the adoption of the constitution." Id.
at 22. See generally Ross, The Liberal Tradition and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (J.
Higham & P. Conkin eds. 1979).
2. On the American Revolution see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787 (1969); F. MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1790 (1965); THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY
OF AMERCAN RADICALISM (A. Young ed. 1976); AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER
AND LIMITS (J.P. Greene ed. 1987); THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: TWO CENTURIES OF
INTERPRETATION (E.S. Morgan ed. 1965); P.S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787 (1983); P.
NAGEL, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE: THE UNION IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1776-1861 (1964); M.
JENSEN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION WITHIN AMERICA (1974); M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978).
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the other promulgated political precepts for establishing a liberal
constitutional republic. Even today, their unparalleled influence on
human rights, social justice, and popular self-government persists as
a basis for political liberation and national self-determination in the
world community of nations. With the 1776 Declaration of
Independence,3 liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness
underscored a triad of unassailable philosophical concepts that
legitimated the American Revolution.'
Under the 1787
Constitution,' however, legality, property, and federalism emerged as
the political precepts that delineated the governmental structure of
the new nation."
The 1787 Constitution was established as the supreme law of
the land,7 and legality, as opposed to equality, assumed precedence

as the formative principle shaping the political and socio-economic
foundation of the new nation. Consequently for Afro-Americans,

despite their protests for freedom and their military contributions
throughout the Revolutionary Era,' legality under the guise of
3. The Declaration of Independance (U.S. 1776).
4. On the Declaration of Independence see C.L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1922 & photo. reprint 1949); P. MAIER. FROM RESISTANCE To REVOLUTION:
COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DECLARATION OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION To BRITAIN, 17651776 (1974); C. REDENIUS, THE AMERICAN IDEAL OF EoUALITY: FROM JEFFERSON'S
DECLARATION To THE BURGER COURT (1981). See also The Meaning of July Fourth for the
Negro, in P.S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRmNGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, PRE-CIVIL WAR
DECADE 1850-1860, at 181-204 (1975); Quarles, Antebellum FreeBlacks and the Spirit of '76,
61 J. NEGRO HIST. 229 (1976).
5. U.S. CONST. arts, I-VII
6. See W.D. JORDAN, WHrrE OVER BLACK. AMERICAN ATITrUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO,
1550-1812, at 331-32 (1968). On the 1787 Constitution see C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTrTrnON OF THE UNITED STATES (1913), who attacks class
motives of the Framers. For critiques on deficiencies, inaccuracies, and misinterpretations
see F. MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE; THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTrrTION (1958);
Diamond, Democracy and "The Federalist":A Reconsideration of the Framers' Inten4 53 AM.
POL SCL. REV. 52 (1959); B.F. WRIGHT, CONSENSUS AND CONrNurrY, 1776-1787 (1958); J.
MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITCS OF THE CONSTITTMON, 1781-1788 (1961); Kenyon, An
Ecomonic Interpretation of the Constitution after Fifty Years, 7 CENTENNIAL REV. 372 (1963).
See also W.H. BENNETr. AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964).
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
8. D.B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823, at 7679 (1975) [hereinafter AGE OF REVOLUTION]. The Revolutionary Era encompassed the years
from 1764 through 1789. See B. QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1961); W.C. NELL, THE COLORED PATRIOTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1968); EARLY
NEGRO WRITING, 1760-1837 (D. Porter ed. 1971); S. KAPLAN, THE BLACK PRESENCE IN THE
ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1770-1800, at 229-41 (1973); SLAVERY AND FREEDOM
IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (I. Berlin & R. Hoffman eds. 1983); Norton,
The Fate of Some Black Loyalists of the American Revolution, 58 J. NEGRO HIST. 402 (1973).
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American constitutional liberalism, as opposed to equality, would
take precedence in determining the legal and societal status of
blacks in the new nation. The political precepts, economic goals,
and societal prejudices, which gave momentum to the drafting of the
1787 Constitution, and which underlay its failure to sanction national
liberty and freedom for black Americans, would conclusively
undermine and eventually defeat the equalitarian goals of the
Revolution.9 Within little more than a half century after its
ratification, the 1787 Constitution would be resolutely attacked for
its failure to eradicate slavery.1"
As the supreme law of the land," the Constitution provided the
framework for the legitimization of those existing societal institutions
which would strengthen the new republic, promote unity of the
thirteen states, and encourage a sustained economic growth.
Therefore the American Constitution, while representing a body of
organic law, is thus more than the document of 1787 and its
subsequent amendments. Yet, at the same time, the absence of laws
abrogating existing societal institutions, practices, or customs (in this
instance, slavery and the subordinate legal status of blacks)
sanctioned a defacto persistence of racism and slavery protected
under the 1787 Constitution. 2
The perpetuation of slavery, hence racism, in an age of
democratic revolution meant that, for Afro-Americans, the
equalitarian spirit of the American Revolution had been
compromised from the beginning in the building of the new nation.
The expressed purposes of the Framers, as they sought to form a
more perfect union, were to "establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our
Posterity."'" Yet, almost one-fifth of the nation's population, black
Americans, were excluded from securing either their freedom or
liberty. 4 Under the aegis of American constitutionalism, legality,
9.
10.
11.
12.

AGE OF REVOLTMON, supra note 8, at 331-35, 340.
Id. at 335.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 274-80.
13. U.S. CONST. preamble.
14. In 1770, blacks comprised 21.4 percent of the Colonial American population. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNrrED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES
To 1957, at 1-16, 756 (1961). With the first census in 1790, blacks made-up approximately
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which underscored the protection of private property, and,
federalism, which relegated residual powers to the states,' 5 provided
the basis for the new republic to protect the institution of slavery.'6
Consequently, the a priori inequality of the races was established.
As emphasized by one analyst of the 1787 Constitution, the
institution of slavery persisted in the new nation primarily as a result
of the Framers "commitment to private property." 7 The 1787
Constitution remained silent in response to the anomalous civil and
legal position of free blacks and illuminated the colonial heritage of
racism.'8 The Revolutionary War Generation also found "a
genuinely multi-racial society" inconceivable.' 9
By 1787, in a land where, for over a century, societal and legal
presumptions had existed which marked anyone of African descent
as a slave, membership in a racially degraded group in which the
great masses were relegated to forced involuntary servitude did little
to encourage equality, even if a member of that group were free.
Historic precedent found in the legal tradition and business practices
of Colonial America had demonstrated that sustained national
economic growth could be achieved through the protection and
development of private property, especially property in slaves."
Notwithstanding the limited recognition of the humanity of the slave
or the limited freedom accorded non-slave blacks, the link between
liberty for whites and protection of their private property in slaves
was considered indissoluble.2 '
In drafting the 1787 Constitution, the Framers proceeded from
20 percent of the American population. Id at 11-12. In the South, the 657,327 slaves
comprised 33.5 percent of that region's population: the 32,457 free blacks made-up 1.6
percent. Id. at 12.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.3; art. 1,§ 9, cl.1; art. IV, § 2. See W.D. JORDAN, supra
note 6, at 349-51.
17.

S. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 181

(1967).
18. See D.B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 3-4 (1966)
[hereinafter WESTERN CULTURE]; W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 276-81, 304-08. See also D.
ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLmCS, 1765-1820 (1971); AGE OF
REVOLUTION, supra note 8; Puzo, Racism and the Western Tradition, 25 J. HIST. IDEAS 579
(1964).
19. S.LYND, supra note 17, at 180. See also J.R. POLE, supra note 1.
20. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 8-10, 127-64; AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra
note 8, at 259.
21. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 350-51.
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the imperative that a viable national economy, a commercial
republic, underscored by private property and free enterprise, ranked22
paramount in the development of a strong central government.
Inherent in that premise were both implied and expressed principles,
a "public philosophy," that laid the foundation for the nation's future
political and socio-economic development. 23 That foundation did not
preclude slavery, which was also indissolubly linked to the protection
of private property.24 "The American colonists were fighting, after
all, for self-determination. And it is now clear that slavery was of
central importance to both the southern and national economies,
and thus to the viability of the 'American System."'"
Notwithstanding the egalitarian and democratic goals of the
Revolution, slavery was very much an issue of import for that
generation. The 1787 Constitution reflects a greater interest in the
protection and expansion of itself as an institution than in the
immediate political goals of the Revolutionists. Existing historic
socio-economic values and racial attitudes in Colonial America also
shaped the priorities of the Framers. 2 In particular, the new
freedoms achieved by whites in the colonies and the expansiveness
of their economic opportunities were contingent on, if not
accomplished by, the extent to which colonial blacks had been
denied liberty and equality. 7 In the absence of freedom, blacks
were also denied property. Under an agriculturally based economy,
land was a source of wealth and power. Protected by the 1787
Constitution, slavery and racism precluded blacks from any
22. H. VON HOLsT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3739 (1887).
23. See Lowi, The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism, 61 AM. POL SC. REV. 5
(1967). See also D. ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 58 (citing PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 162 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965)). "The ideology of the American Revolution is often
identified as 'constitutional liberalism,' and its adherents as Whigs. Its most appropriate slogan
was 'Liberty and Property."' Id. See also D.O. WHITE, CONNECICt'S BLACK SOLDIERS, 17761783, at 57-64 (1973), who showed that of some 289 blacks in that state's militia, five
reported Liberty as their surname and seventeen used Freedom or Freeman. Id at 58-59.
See generally THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

OF AMERICA IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 1754-1788 (J.R. Pole ed. 1970).
24. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 350-51.
25. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 256. See W.B. SCowt, IN PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1977); B.H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION

(1980).
26. See E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 316-37.
27. Id. at 4-5.
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meaningful competition in the development of the vast resources of
this new land for their own economic advantage.
Slavery thus survived the Revolution. It found protection under
the guise of legality not only in the Declaration of Independence,
but in the 1787 Constitution as well.' The persistence of the
institution, then, must first be understood within the historic context
of the societal and legal status of blacks in pre-Revolutionary War
America. Perhaps more than any other constitutional issue in
American life, historical linkages are imperative to provide the
to examine American
necessary
conceptual framework
constitutionalism within the context of race, slavery, and property.
Primary to any analysis of race and slavery, within the context of the
framing of the Constitution, is John Locke's Two Treatises of
Government (Treatises)." That political tract propounded a socialpolitical contract based upon principles of government by consent,
the equality of all men, and their entitlement to inalienable rights?
Locke's philosophy provided the American colonists with the basis
by which they legitimated their Revolution.31 Yet despite Locke's
insistence on freedom, both the Declaration of Independence and
the 1787 Constitution sanctioned slavery.3" Historical debate has
thus centered on whether or not Locke's Treatises provided the
rationale for the new nation to endorse the institution.33
On one side of that debate are the anti-slavery proponents who
maintain that slavery represented an inherent contradiction to
Locke's philosophy of inalienable rights and the equality of man.'
Locke's basic premise in the Treatises, which he did not qualify on
the basis of race, was that all men are in "a state of perfect
freedom," and "a state of equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal."35 He further emphasized, "that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. J.LOCKE, Two Treatises of Govemment in Two TREAISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 77
(H. Morley intro. 1884).

30. Id.
31. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 289.
32. See supra note 16.
33. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 118-21.

34. Id
35. J.LOCKE, supra note 29, 1 4, at 192.
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health, liberty or possessions."' In opposition to that position, a
general consensus exists that "[b]ecause John Locke celebrated the
importance of natural liberty, he had to place slavery outside the
social compact, which [he said] was designed to protect man's
inalienable rights." a"
Thus, while the social contract theory expressed in Locke's
political treatise provided the basis for the American colonists to
wage a revolution, paradoxically, it also provided a philosophical
basis for white Americans to prevent Afro-Americans from achieving
freedom in the formation of the new nation.' Notwithstanding that,
a careful reading of the Treatises shows that Locke's discussion of
slavery did not embrace or endorse the institution of inheritable and
perpetual slavery that developed in the American colonies and found
protection under the 1787 Constitution. Admittedly, Locke placed
the enslavement of men captured in a "just war" outside the social
contract.39
Yet, by 1787, to what extent did this form of
enslavement apply to American born blacks or, indeed, to most
Africans, who became victims of the trade? In relation to race,
slavery, and the 1787 Constitution, the historical persistence of this
debate thus raises several questions. One would have to ask, first,
what was inherent in Locke's philosophy that suggested to the
Revolutionary War Generation that his theory of the social contract
excluded blacks? Considering Locke's position on the equality of
man, if his social contract had neither implicitly nor explicitly
sanctioned the enslavement of blacks, then what rationales, other
than that of virulent racism and economic necessity, provided the
basis for the protection of slavery under the 1787 Constitution?
The extent to which Locke's principles in the Declaration of
Independence were incorporated in the 1787 Constitution has thus
been a point of contention among legalists, scholars, and social
reformers.'
A basic issue in this debate is whether or not blacks
were included in the social contract and thus entitled to the
protection of inalienable rights by the government under the 1787
36. Id. 116, at 193-94. See also J. DUNN, THE POLMcAL THOUGHr OF JOHN LocKE (1969);
Cohen, The American Revolution and Natural Law Theory, 39 J. HIST. IDEAS 491 (1978).
37. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 45.
38. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 119.
39. J. LOCKE, supra note 29, 196, at 293.
40. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 118-21.
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Constitution. 1 Students of the American Revolution and the 1787
Constitution are thus challenged to answer that question, if possible,
without prejudice. Just why did the Founding Fathers, who
subscribed to Enlightenment philosophies, compromise the
Revolution and the future economic and political stability of the
nation by protecting slavery? That slavery persisted under the 1787
Constitution requires, then, that any analysis of that document must
give consideration to the intellectual environment in which it was
drafted. Prevailing values and virtues, customs, and traditions that
existed in Colonial and Revolutionary War America, and which
found expression in that document, are equally important for this
analysis.
As a basis for understanding the racial motives of the Founding
Fathers, particularly their reluctance to destroy the institution of
slavery, one scholar provided the following perspectives in his
analysis of those two documents, which he said were drafted in an
age propelled by profits, prejudices, and the protection of property. 2
"The Declaration of Independence, it is now argued, was a white
man's document that its author rarely applied to his or to any slave
[and] [t]he Constitution created aristocratic privilege while
consolidating black bondage."43 The priority of the Founding
Fathers, however, was the establishment of a more perfect union,
and with independence secured, a viable national economy within
the constraints of state federalism was foremost.' Perhaps, most
importantly, "[tihe master passion of the age was not with extending
liberty to blacks but with erecting republics for whites."" Certainly
the Revolutionary War Generation recognized the incongruity of
fighting for independence, liberty, and self-determination, while
holding one out of five people in that land in slavery.'
That
contradiction, however, was rationalized. The new Americans, most
notably in the South, "were entirely satisfied--for reasons resting on
their own reading of the Lockeian contract--that slaves and their
descendants had never been parties to the contractual system and
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 Am. HiSm. REV. 81, 83 (1972).
Id. at 81-82.
See H. VON HoLsT, supra note 22, at 43-44 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2).
Freehling, supra note 42, at 83.
W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 289-90, 322-23.
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that the rights due to English subjects did not extend to them."47
Not surprisingly then, when one considers the three
constitutional provisions which directly relate to slavery, all
underscore the political and economic advantages of holding blacks
in slavery, but under the guise of legality.' American constitutional
liberalism rests on the protection of vested interests; foremost
among them is private property."' And, slaves were property! Thus,
paramount to any examination of the 1787 Constitution as the
supreme law of the land, in relation to Afro-Americans, is
consideration of the legal environment which provided the basis for
slavery finding protection under that document. With its emphasis
on legality, as opposed to equality, the issue of slavery must also be
examined within the contextual framework of property as it related
to concepts of liberty and the reality of the political economy that
existed before the Revolutionary War Era. The "intellectual and
constitutional" history of the Revolutionary War Era reveals that,
"the protection of property had been one of the major
considerations behind the writing of the Constitution and the
creation of the federal union.""
The Afro-American slave was legally recognized as property. 1
His dual status as human capital had been established under colonial
law, having evolved from custom, tradition, and the mercantile values
of an agrarian-based colonial society." With their heritage of British
common law, which made property rights indistinguishable from
contract," tempered by a heritage of slavery, the Framers of the
1787 Constitution viewed the inviolability of property as sacrosanct. 4
In review of the conception of property under the English common
law, emphasis has been placed on the centrality of property to the
47. J.R. POLE, supra note 1, at 25.
48. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
49. See AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 259.
50. Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 74, 75-76 (M.J. Harmon ed. 1978).
51. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 30-35, 208-11.
52. See generally A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOUR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978). See also H. CATrERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (1932); DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY
OF THE SLAVE TRADE To AMERICA (E. Donnan ed. 1930-35).
53. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103-04 (1979) (citing
J.J. POWELL, 1 ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CNTRACTiS AND AGREEMENTS iii-iv (1790)).
54. See H. VON HoLsr, supra note 22, at 19 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3).
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definition of liberty." "Like their British contemporaries, Americans
believed that just as private rights in property could not exist
without constitutional procedures, liberty could be lost if private
rights in property were not protected."'
Central to the American colonial experience, within the context
of British common law, liberty and property were also
indistinguishable. 7
Within this prevailing societal and legal
consensus that conjoined liberty and property "[niot only was the
security of property the purpose of government, it was the very
definition of government by law, for a government that failed to
protect property ceased to be a government.""5 In Colonial America,
consequently, the concept of property emerged as part of the
definition of liberty and constitutional government. One could not
have property without security; and, security in the protection of
property could only be achieved in those societies, which under law,
limited the confiscatory powers of the state. Governments, thus,
would have as their ultimate goal the protection of private property.
In the absence of those constraints property was not property if,
without the possessor's consent, a government could disturb its legal
possession. 9
Within this contextual definition, which links liberty to property,
the extent to which slavery would or could continue to exist as a
viable institution in a nation, whose very foundation was secured by
declarations of liberty and equality, challenged the integrity of the
new nation. That slavery found support under the 1787 Constitution
not only compromised the liberal and republican principles on which
the nation was founded, but also established historic precedents
which have found expression in the present racial inequalities which
limit opportunities for people of African descent. Even with the
commemoration of the bicentennial of the 1787 Constitution of the
United States of America, legal ambivalence and societal
discrimination--the American dilemma--that has marked the African
presence in the colonies and Revolutionary War America persists.
55. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 207-11. See also AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra
note 8, at 258-59.
56. J.P. REID, CONSITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33 (1986).
57. See AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 258-62.
58. J.P. REID, supra note 56, at 40. See also ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN
LAW (D.H. Flaharty ed. 1969).
59. J.P. REID, supra note 56, at 41.
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As emphasized in a discussion of American racism, "[t]hrough much
of American history the shadowy presence of the slave was an
irrepressible reminder of the systematic violence and exploitation
which underlay a society genuinely dedicated to individual freedom
and equality of opportunity. "' The ultimate paradox, then, is that
a nation born in revolution, with the express purpose of achieving
self-government, was in the final analysis, the last great repository
of slavery among the western nations.
The issue, then, when race and slavery are considered within
the context of American constitutionalism, is not whether the
Framers, in drafting that document, attempted to legitimate the
freedom of Americans to develop private property, including slavery,
as a basis to promote laissez-faire capitalism under the Constitution.
By 1787, that issue was moot, not only in terms of the historic
commercial development of the nation, but especially because of
Afro-American slavery which, it must be emphasized again, was as
indissolubly linked to the American economy as liberty for whites
was to the protection of private property." Thus, while the Framers
might have viewed slavery as morally reprehensible, American
constitutionalism, with its emphasis on legality, sanctioned the
perpetuation of an institution, which clearly obviated racial equality.
Underlying the basis of American constitutionalism, then, were
historic forces in which the institution of slavery played a significant
role, not only in the development of a viable colonial economy, but
also in its impact on the social and economic white class structure
which developed in Colonial America.62 In a discussion of the law
of slavery, as a factor which encouraged the development of a racial
hierarchy that distinguished slave blacks from both slaveowning and
non-slaveowning whites, it has been explained:
To secure the allegiance of non-slaveowners to the political
interests of the master class, they had to be assured that they
would not be as subordinated as slaves. Law could provide
such assurances by drawing rigid lines around the class of
slaves, thereby guaranteeing that the lesser protections that
60. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 85. See also D. SOUTHERN, GUNNAR MYRDAL
AND BLAcK-WHrrE RELATIONS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, 1944-1969
(1987).
61. See AGE OF REVOLUT1ON, supra note 8, at 259-62.
62. See W.D. JoRDAN, supra note 6, at 315-21; E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 225-30.
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the law gave to slaves would not seep into the law governing
non-slaveowners.6"
In the development of slavery in Colonial America, then,
economic necessity and political imperatives would provide the
fulcrum for the commingling of race, juxtaposed to class. This
contributed to the process which saw the subordination of people of
African descent, their exclusion from the body politic, and the
legitimization of their status as slaves under the 1787 Constitution.'
Yet, literally from the beginning of the importation of Africans
into the American colonies in 1619, invidious racial discrimination
and forced involuntary servitude had distinguished their presence in
Colonial America.' Even at the same time that the nation's first
legislative body, the Virginia House of Burgess, was established in
1619, societal differences distinguished the races." The initial legal
status of those first blacks is not known: eventually some became
free; others continued in a state of life-time servitude. What is
known, however, is that from their arrival, their status in the
colonies differed substantially from whites. 7
According to one scholar, the development of slavery in
Colonial America until the 1660s represented an "unthinking
decision."' That assessment, based on an analysis of private papers,
wills, inventories of estates, bills of sale, and public records,
including censuses, judicial decisions and legislative enactments,
however, applies primarily to Virginia.'
In the other colonies,
including Maryland, but excepting Georgia, slavery developed
literally at the time of their origin and early development.' In those
63. M.V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860, at 38 (1981). See also
W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 44-98; BREEN, A Changing Labor Force and Race Relations in

Vbginia, 1669-1710, 7 J. Soc. Hisr. 3 (1973); M. JERNEGAN, LABOURING AND DEPENDENT
CLASSES IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1607-1783 (1931); Higginbotham, Racism and the Early
American Legal Process 1619-1896, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL SOC. SCL. 1 (1973); A.
KUUKOFF, TOBACCO AND SLAVES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN CULTURES IN THE
CHESAPEAKE, 1680-1800 (1986).

64. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
65. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 44-98.
66. Id. at 44-45.
67. Id. at 44-45, 73-81.
68. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 44. See generally id. at 44-98 (chapter entitled,
"Unthinking Decision, Enslavement of Negroes in America to 1700").
69. Id. at 74-82.

70. Id. at 66-85.
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two colonies slavery and racism developed simultaneously, mutually
reinforcing each other, before statutory recognition of the institution
in the 1660s.7" In Virginia, however, legal recognition that slavery
existed in the colony was expressed in a 1661 law prescribing
punishment for runaways. 72 Specific reference was made to fugitives
blacks "incapable of making addition of time."' In the previous
year, however, Virginia in 1660, had enacted into law a statute
which limited the period of servitude for whites, providing that "for
the future no servant comeing into the country without indentures,
of what christian [white] nation soever shall serve longer then those
of our own country, of the like age."74
Racial gender
discrimination, however, provided the statutory basis by which blacks
were relegated to perpetual slavery, when in 1662 it was declared
that "whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by any
Englishman upon a negrowoman shall be slave or free . . . all
children born in this colony shall be slave or free only according to
'
the condition of the mother."75
That statute was significant in two
ways. It provided legal recognition that the practice of enslaving
blackwomen for life had existed prior to the 1662 enactment. 6
Then by making the status of the child contingent on that of the
mother's, Virginia had also translated into law another prevailing
practice in the colony, that of relegating children born to black
women to a period of lifetime servitude.' Thus, even before blacks
represented a significant numerical presence in that colony, Virginia
had provided for the continuous reproduction of a permanent labor
force of slaves through its black women, while establishing legal
precedent that slavery would be the future societal condition of
blacks.
71. Id. at 80.

72. 2

STATUTES

OF

VIRGINIA

26 (W. Hening ed. 1809-1823) '"hat in case any English

servant shall run away in company with any negroes who are incapable of makeing satisfaction
by addition of time," he must serve for the Negroes' lost time as well as his own. Id.
73. Id.
74. 1 STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 539 (W. Henning ed. 1809-1823); See 1659 Va. Acts XIV
(at a Grand Assembly held at James Cittie, the Thirteenth of March, 1659 (Session of 165960) "An act for repealing an act for Irish Servants"), reprinted in 2 COLONY LAws OF
VIRGINIA, 1642-1660, at 528-29 (J.
Cushing ed. 1978). See also J.P. GUILD, BLACK LAws OF
VIRGINIA (1936 & photo. reprint 1969). Maryland enacted a similar law in 1639 entitled "An
Act Limiting The Times of Servants." 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 80 (1883).
75. 2 STATUTrEs OF VIRGINIA, supra note 72, at 170.
76. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 75.
77. Id. at 76.
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Discrimination against black women began quite early in the
economic development of Virginia, as the white colonists quickly
capitalized on their dual contributions to the colonial labor force,
both for their labor and as reproducers of future supplies of lifetime
laborers.' Wills and inventories always show black females valued
higher than men, black or white, and white women." Colonial tax
laws enacted in the late 1620s and early 1630s affirm that black
women, unlike white women, were put to work like men in the
fields.' Even when free, that tax distinction remained unchanged,
not only as a basis to establish the legal inferiority of black women,
but also to reinforce their subordinate societal status, while imposing
additional economic burdens on their attempts to survive as free
women, as seen in the Tax Act of 166881 which announced:
Whereas some doubts have arisen whether negro women set
free were still to be accompted tithable according to a former
act, it is declared.., that negro women, though permitted to
enjoy their Freedome yet ought not in all respects to be
admitted to a full fruition of the exemptions and impunities of
the English, and are still lyable to payment of taxes 2
While judicial decisions, laws, customs, and traditions in Virginia
would suggest that, until the 1660s, blacks occupied a nebulous legal
status between slavery and freedom,' in Massachusetts Bay, slavery
found legal sanction quite early in the history of that colony. In
what could be viewed as its first constitution, the 1641
Massachusetts Civil Body of Liberties, 8 slavery was established
78. E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 310.

79. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 76.
80. Id. at 77.
81. 2 STATuIrES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 72, at 267. For additional information on law and
free black women in colonial America see J.P. GUILD, supra note 74, at 94-129, who notes
that this 1668 statute was the first direct reference to free blacks in the law. Id at 129 n.6.
In addition, Guild notes that a 1670 law which gave elective franchise to freeholders
presumably included free black property holders. Id. at 129 n.7. For information on and
comparison to colonial white women see M. SALOM, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY
IN EARLY AMERICA (1986).
82. 2 STATurES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 72, at 267.

83. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 71-82.
84. MAss. BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641) (considered to be Massachusetts' first constitution),
reprinted in 5 W.F. SWINDLER. SOURCES AND DOCUMEmTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTIUTIONS
46-67 (1975).
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within only three years after the importation of blacks in 1638.'
However, that law was qualified by the admonition that "there shall
never be any bond-slavery, villenage or Captivitie amongst us unles
it be lawful Captives taken in just wares, and such strangers as
willingly selle themselves or are solde to us ...

This exempts none

from servitude who shall be Judged thereto by Authoritie."'
That specific enactment has historic significance in yet another
way. On its face, that statute established historic precedent which
found expression in the tragic incongruity of racial and ethnic
discrimination which has since distinguished American law, a legal
system which, from inception, allowed for the protection of the
freedoms of specially designated groups, while denying it to others.87
In a discussion of the origin of slavery in Massachusetts Bay, one
writer emphasized that, "the Puritan settlers were seeking to
guarantee in writing their own liberty without closing off the
opportunity of taking it from others whom they identified with the
Biblical term, 'strangers."'"
In Massachusetts Bay Colony, then,
historic precedent was thus established which enabled subsequent
American legalists to enact into law, privileges and immunities for
most whites, but which were understood by custom and tradition as
exclusionary to "strangers." Quite early in the development of
American law, then, euphemisms were quickly applied in reference
to discriminated groups." Colonial lawmakers thus were able to
cloak illiberalism, religious pluralism, ethnocentrism, racism, and
their departure from English Common law, while establishing
precedent in American law that would provide statutory justifications
for ethnic, religious, and racial discrimination.
The Massachusetts Civil Body of Liberties specifically
acknowledged that colony's support of African slavery although,
when that document was drafted in 1641,'* blacks accounted for less
than three percent of the labor force in New England.91 Moreover,
while the economic survival of Massachusetts Bay would eventually
depend quite heavily on the slave trade, the use of slave labor never
85. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 66-68.
86. MAss. BODY OF LIBERTIES § 72 (1641), reprinted in 5 SWINDLER. supra note 84, at 61.
87. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 67-68.
88. Id. at 68.

89. Id.
90. Id at 67-68.
91. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 66.
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figured prominently in its development.' Even so, the necessity of
slave labor was recognized as critical to the future success of the
new land, as seen in a 1645 letter written to the governor of
Massachusetts Bay colony in which the writer stated "I doe not see
how wee can thrive untill wee gett into a stock of slaves sufficient
to doe all our business."" Recognition that white indentured
servants, protected by legally contractual limitations of service, could
never be reduced to lifetime servants, much less provide the basis
of a permanent labor force, contributed to the demand for black
slaves. As the writer tersely stated in his letter, unless slavery was
encouraged to develop:
our children's children will hardly see this great Continent
filled with people, soe that our servants [whites] will still
desire freedome to plant for them selves, and not stay but
for verie great wages. And I suppose you know verie well
how wee shall maynteyne 20 Moores cheaper than one
Englishe servant.'
Thus, while the origin of slavery in seventeenth century colonial
America was an "unthinking decision,"" the rapid legal sanction of
slavery quite early in the settlement and development of
Massachusetts Bay suggests otherwise.
In that colony, the
establishment of slavery was deliberate, systematic, and unabashedly
specific in intent and purpose.' Even in the one instance when
slavery was statutorily prohibited in seventeenth century colonial
America, as seen in a 1652 Rhode Island law, 97 that statute had no
force of law:"
Whereas, there is a common course practised amongst English
92. Id. at 66-71. See also LJ. GREENE, THE NEGRO IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND, 16201776 (1966).
93. Letter from Emanuel Downing to John Winthrop, Jr. (1645) reprinted in 4
MASSACHUSETS HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 65 (1863).
94. Id.

95. See supra note 68.
96. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 67-69.
97.

1 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN

NEW ENGLAND 243 (J. Bartlett ed. 1856). See also W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 70.
98. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 70.
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men to buy negers, to that end they may have them for
service or slaves forever, for the preventinge of such practices
among us, let it be ordered, that no blacke mankind or white
being forced by covenent bond, or otherwise, to serve a man
or his assighnes longer than ten yeares .... And, at the end
or terme of ten yeares to sett them free, as the manner is

with the English servants."
The Rhode Island Act was never repealed; nor was it ever
enforced, as that colony's economic survival would soon depend
quite heavily on the slave trade."° At the time of its enactment,
however, Rhode Island's black population was minimal, but the
statute points to the early development of the slave trade in
Colonial

America. 0 1

Implied

in

this

1652

law

is

the

acknowledgement that the blacks who had been imported into the
colony were recognized as slaves thus, underscoring the rapidity by
which the American colonists accepted the institution of African
slavery. Yet, the existence of a statute which specifically limited the
term of servitude for blacks established a legal basis for that group's
claim to freedom." z In this respect, the Rhode Island statute does
have historic significance. In yet another way the statute is
important for it illustrates that quite early in the history of Colonial
99.

1 RECORDS OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE, supra note 98, at 243. See W.D.
supra note 6, at 70. Georgia, founded in 1732, in an expression of modem
philanthrophy, expressly prohibited slavery in its colonial charter until 1749, when the
principal founder of the colony, George Oglethorpe, was forced by his colonists to allow the
importation of slaves. WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 144-50. Manager of the highly
successful and profitable slave-trading Royal African Company, Oglethorpe's support of
slavery on the one hand and his indictment of the institution on the other is representative
of contradiction in thought and action of liberal reformers during the age of the
Enlightenment. Id. at 145. See also F. HUTCHESON, 2 A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 202
(1755), who argued against African slavery, but considered lifetime slavery for the English
unemployed as appropriate for the "ordinary punishment of such idle vagrants as, after proper
admonitions and tryals of temporary servitude, cannot be engaged to support themselves and
their families by any useful labours." Id.
While laws could be passed to prohibit slavery, economic self-interest would turn the laws
into a dead letter or they would be repealed. For the origin of slavery in all three groups of
colonies see W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 66-84. For a bibliographic discussion of sources
on the slavery and freedom of blacks in colonial and Revolutionary War America see Berlin,
Time, Space, and the Evolution of Afro-American Society on British MainlandNorthlandNorth
America, 85 Am. HIST. REV. 44 (1980).
100. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 70-71.
101. Id. at 66.
102. L.J. GREENE, supra note 92, at 125. See also W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 70.
JORDAN,
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America, custom and tradition exerted more force than the rule of
law in relegating blacks to lifetime servitude.
Consequently, apart from the southern colonies of Virginia and
to a lesser extent Maryland, the rapid legal sanction of slavery in
colonial America contravenes the assertion that the enslavement of
blacks represented an "unthinking decision.""o In both instances,
the assessments are based on the absence of a comprehensive body
of slave codes. While British common law1t 4 provided the basis for
early American law on slavery"z and societal practices demonstrated
the acceptance of involuntary lifetime servitude for blacks, a
comprehensive body of slave codes for the American colonies would
not be enacted until the period from the 1660s through the 1730s."
Clearly, the absence of a specific body of laws defining the
institution cannot sustain the fact that a statutory definition of
blacks as slaves was required for the establishment of the institution:
that indeed, de facto slavery preceded de jure slavery in both
Virginia and Maryland. 7 Codification only reflected the reality that
for slavery to be economically profitable, the process of exploiting
and subjugating a mass of unwilling laborers to forced lifetime
servitude, based only on race, required systematic and deliberate
oppression. That slavery was the desired legal status for blacks was
also reflected in colonial laws and practices which discouraged slave
manumissions."°
A prevailing historical consensus does not deny the existence
of pervasive racial prejudices in seventeenth century colonial
America. Even when the black population was relatively negligible
and their labor contribution minimal, white class distinctions and
economic necessity commingled with white racism, precipitating the
early development of black slavery in colonial America."°
Particularly, great extremes in wealth and a rigid class structure
103. See supra note 68-70 and accompanying text.
104. WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 208-10.
105. Id.
106. For slave codes see 1 STA'urEs OF VIRGINIA. supra note 72, at 257, 435, 439-42; 2
id. at 113-14, 240, 388; 3 id. at 447-62; 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 74, at 53, 80,
352-53, 409-10, 428, 443-44, 453-54, 464, 469; 2 ARCHIVES Or MARYLAND, 147-48, 335-36,
527 (1883).
107. W.D. JORDAN,supra note 6, at 71-82.
108. WESrERN CULTURE. supra note 18, at 57.
109. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 44-98.
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among whites encouraged a climate conducive to the acceptance of
African slavery among the colonists.11 Moreover, precedent existed

in English law under a statute enacted in 1547, which provided for
the enslavement of Englishmen."' That statute also detailed
punishment that differed little from that prescribed for African
slaves in the American colonies.1
This statute was the Vagrancy Act,1 designed to combat
vagabondage in England. 1 " If adjudged a vagabond, justice required
the individual to be branded with a "V" on his chest and to be made
a "slave" for two years. "5 The citizen who brought the accused
before the justices of the peace was given complete authority over
the vagabond, and his legal responsibilities included giving "the said
slave ...

bread, water or small drink, and refuse meat, and cause

him to work, by beating, chaining or otherwise, in such work and
labour as he shall put him unto, be it never so vile. 116 To counter
resistance from the "slave" the master could "put a ring of iron
about his neck, arm or leg." 7 If the "slave" ran away and was
apprehended, the punishment by law was that he was to be branded
on either the cheek or forehead and sentenced "to be slave to his
said master for ever."118
Loath to enforce the act, the English repealed it three years
later as much for humanitarian and libertarian reasons as for
110. I. On wealth, power, and the class structure in colonial America until the
Revolutionary War see G.B. NASH, RACE, CLASS, AND POLmCS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY (1986); A.H. JONES, THE WEALTH OF A NATION To
BE: THE AMERICAN COLONIES ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTnON (1980); P.H. LINDBERT &
J.WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN INEQUALITY: A MACRO-ECONOMIC HISTORY (1980); G.B. NASH,
THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF

THE AMERICAN REvOLUtnON (1979); Greene, The Social Origins of the American Revolution:
An Evaluation and an Interpretation, 88 PoL SCI. Q. 1 (1973); E. COUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE
IN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN NEW YORK 17601790 (1981); Lockridge, Social Change and the Meaning of the American Revolution, 6 J.Soc.
HIST. 403 (1973).
111. An Act for the Punishing of Vagabonds, and for the Relief of the Poor and Impotent
Persons, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) [hereinafter Vagrancy Act].
112. Id. See also W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.
113. Vagrancy Act, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547).
114. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.
115. Vagrancy Act, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3, §§ 2, 3 (1547); W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.
116. Vagrancy Act, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3, § 3 (1547); W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.
117. Vagrancy Act, 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3, § 8 (1547); W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.
118. Vagrancy Act, 1 Edw. 6, ch.3, § 4 (1547); W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.
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economic imposition."9 The pool of unemployed was so great that
force was not necessary to secure cheap labor without the
responsibility of lifetime supervision and provisioning, however
meager, of recalcitrant vagabonds."'
While a labor system
subsequently developed in England which led to apprenticeship,
indentured servitude, and bound labor involving children of indigent
parents, lifetime slavery was never again undertaken in that
country."' That a conceptual heritage of the of slavery existed in
English law meant that the American colonist in the seventeenth
century "possessed certain fairly consistent connotations which were
to help shape English perceptions of the way Europeans should
properly treat the newly discovered peoples overseas.""n
The subordinate status of the lower classes and the degradation
of the dispossessed in England contributed to the ease by which the
institution of slavery developed in colonial America. In addition to
the class structure, precedent had been established in English law
that allowed for the subordination of laborers, while sanctioning
involuntary forced lifetime servitude." In a discussion of the origin
of slavery in colonial Virginia, one writer explained that the
treatment of white indentured servants "stopped short of actual
enslavement.""
The enormity of their debasement, however,
brought that writer to the conclusion that, initially, "[iun Virginia too,
before 1660, it might have been difficult to distinguish race prejudice
from class prejudice."1" Yet, before the turn of the century, race
became the common denominator to distinguish the free from the
unfree and white labor from black labor.
However, most
importantly, while blacks could be forced into lifetime servitude,
"there was never any such thing as perpetual slavery for any white
man [despite their subordination] in any English Colony."" On the
other hand, had the possibility existed, white servants would have
119. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 51.

120. Id.
121. Id at 52.

122. Id
123. Id
124. E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 324.

125. Id at 327.
126. A.E. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CONFLICr LABOR IN
AMERICA, 1606-1776, at 171 (1947).
See also D.W. GALENSON, WHrrE SERVITUDE IN
COLONIAL AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1981).
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been transformed into slaves, although "the transformation of free
[white] men into slaves would have been a tricky business."127 In
outlining the process, which could have resulted had attempts been
made to force whites into lifetime slavery, one analyst noted:
It would have had to proceed by stages, each carefully
calculated to stop short of provoking rebellion. And, if
successful, it would have reduced, if it did not end, the flow
of potential slaves from England and Europe. Moreover, it
would have required a conscious, deliberate, public decision
...

the home government would almost certainly have vetoed

the move, for fear of a rebellion."2
That decision would not be necessary despite the economies of
labor shortages in Colonial America which initially made white labor
an attractive alternative to red and black labor.1 Until the 1660s,
less risk was involved in securing a man's labor for a period of five
to seven years, as opposed to life."3 In the face of high mortality
rates during the first half century of settlement there were no
certainties that any laborer would live beyond that time."3 In
addition, compared to the immigration and labor costs to secure
white indentured servants, the high transportation rates and the
purchase prices demanded for Africans as slaves seemed virtually
prohibitive."' Thus, in a newly developing economy, despite minimal
laborer maintenance costs, only limited and uncertain profits could
be realized in exploiting a scarce supply of involuntary lifetime
African slave laborers. Then, too, the liabilities which ensued,
specifically, protracted conflict and warfare, when whites attempted
to extract labor from the indigenous Amerindian population,
rendered their labor an unattractive alternative, despite their cultural
values and economic stages of production. 3
E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 296-97.
Id
W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 91.
E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 297-98.
131. Id.
132. Id at 297 n.4. "A newly arrived English servant with five years or more to serve cost
1,000 pounds of tobacco .... The earliest surviving contract for importation of Negroes..
* called for their sale on arrival at 2,000 pounds apiece." Id.
133. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 89-91.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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Thus, while blacks were enslaved before 1660, economic factors
in conjunction with changing social and demographic factors would,
after the 1660s, mark a turning point, which led to increased
freedom for whites and a descent to slavery for blacks."3 Although
colonial mortality rates declined, there was also a reduction in the
immigration of white indentured servants."5 At the same time, the
numbers of Africans imported as slaves increased substantially."3
Dutch ships carrying "Black Cargoes" were no longer required to pay
import duties.'
With the addition of massive numbers brought in
under the Royal African Company, a slave trading enterprise
founded in 1672,"~ African slavery became economically feasible.
Most importantly, aside from legal limitations inherent in the
indentured servant contracts,' 9 which the home government most
certainly would have enforced, white labor imposed the additional
burden of relegating to lifetime servitude an unfree labor force
indistinguishable from free men in the colonies."
With the
reduction in importation costs, black labor imposed none of these
disabilities. 4'
White indentured servants remained an important source of
labor throughout the colonial period.
Yet, with a growing
proportion of the population relegated to slavery, competition in the
development of the new land was greatly reduced, thus enhancing
the life chances of whites. Then, too, with the large-scale increase
in African slave importations after the 1660s, Virginia's ruling class
saw the necessity for whites to close ranks. 4 Initially, the threat of
slave insurrections was feared less than successful militant resistance
from large numbers of oppressed subordinate whites. 43 "The fear
of a servile insurrection alone was sufficient to make slaveowners
court the favor of all other whites in a common contempt for
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 299-315.
Id at 299.
Id
Id
Id
W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 47-48, 52.
See E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 296-97.
Id at 299.
Id at 328.
Id
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persons of dark complexion."'" Consequently, "Virginia's ruling
classes, having proclaimed that all white men were superior to black,
went on to offer their social (but white) inferiors a number of
benefits previously denied them."145 At the end of their period of
indenturedness, white servants, under law, were given basic
necessities which would enable them to become self-sufficient,
including corn, money, a musket and, most importantly, fifty acres
of land for them to establish a basis for economic self-sufficiency ."
Also, as freeholders, and with property requirements reduced for
voting, former indentured servants then had an opportunity to
become a part of the body politic.'47 Without possession of slaves,
however, attempts by whites in the South to improve their economic
position were not always successful.
As the institution expanded in the South, the necessity of
unchallenged white control over black labor, the unmitigated
domination of blacks by whites, was nowhere more evident than in
South Carolina."
Unlike Virginia or Maryland, slavery was
instituted with the origin of that colony even before official
settlement began.'49
And, from the beginning, under the 1669
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, 150 the freemen of the colony
were provided with "absolute power and authority over [their] negro
slaves."'' While that proviso encapsulated what became the basic
foundation of the American slave codes in giving whites absolute
control over slaves, that document has historic significance in yet
another way. Its author, John Locke, would subsequently publish in
1690, Two Treatises of Government. 2 With its emphasis on the
equality of men, all of whom were entitled to inalienable rights, the
Treatises became the manifesto to justify the American Revolution.
However, Locke's formulation of property, the basis of the social
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 344.
Id
Id.
Id. at 345.

148. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 84-85.
149. D. WALLACE. SOUTH CAROLINA, A SHORT HISTORY 1520-1948, at 31 (1951)
150. The Fundamental Constitutions of North Carolina 1669 art. 110, reprinted in 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTImUONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1408 (B.P. Poore comp. 1877).
151. Id See also 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 55 (1836); Sirmans, The
Legal Status of the Slave in South Carolina, 1670-1740, 28 J.S. HIST. 462 (1962).
152. J. LOCKE, supra note 29.
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contract, 53 provided the Framers with a political mandate which was
used to justify and sanction the institution of Afro-American slavery
in the 1787 Constitution. t"4 Yet, some scholars would ask us to
exonerate Locke, as one analyst explained in a discussion of the
Fundamental Constitutions, which provided not only for slavery but
also for an "extremely hierarchial distribution of land, status, and
political power in Carolina." 5 The monumental contributions he
made to human freedom embodied in the Declaration of
Independence it is argued, should be distinguished from the reality
of his life. Locke's importance for the American Revolution was
that, ultimatedly, he represented "the great enemy of all absolute
and arbitrary power.'156 Even though Locke was one of the leading
thinkers of the Enlightenment, he was also "the last major
philosopher to seek a justification for absolute and perpetual
'
slavery." 157
While it can be conceded that Locke placed slavery outside the
social contract, a careful reading of the Treatises clearly shows that
the conditions under which blacks were enslaved in America were
never legitimated by Locke, either implicitly or explicitly. 15 8 . Yet,
historians restate emphatically, and usually with limited discussion,
their interpretation of Locke's support of slavery from the
Treatises.'59 Locke imagined slavery as "the state of War continued
between a lawful conqueror and a captive. '' "w Locke, however,
prefaced that oft-repeated statement, so quickly seized upon by
scholars who have attempted to justify the Framers' rejection of the
equality of blacks, within a theoretical construct. In this passage
from the Treatises Locke insisted on freedom and views slavery as
a state of forced involuntary servitude:
The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior
power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative
153. See generally iU
154. See WEsTERN CULTURE, supra note 18,
155. J.R. POLE, supra note 1, at 9.
156. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at
157. Id.
158. See generally J. LOcKE supra note 29.
159. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18,
160. J. LocKE. supra note 29, 24, at 203.
at 559-60.

at 119.
45.

at 118-21.
See also AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8,
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authority of man .... For a man, not having the power of

his own life, cannot b[y] compact or his own consent enslave
himself to any one, not put himself under the absolute,
arbitrary power of another to take away his life when he
pleases ....This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is

nothing else but the state of war continued between a lawful
conqueror and a captive.16
Further, Locke distinguished between what constitutes a "just"
war from an "unjust" war, emphasizing that involuntary slavery
forced on victims conquered in an "unjust" war can never be
justified. 62 As he said in the following commentary, "[t]hat the
aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and
unjustly invades another man's right, can, by such an unjust war,
never come to have a right over the conquered, will be easily agreed
by all men."'" To make this distinction clear and unqualified, Locke
provided an analogy between warfare and home invasion. First, he
explained that a robber, who invades a man's home and then forces
the owner to convey the deed to his property, under threat to his
life, could under no circumstances claim legal ownership or a valid
title in that property."6 Within the context of an "unjust" war,
Locke admonished, "[j]ust such a title by his sword has an unjust
conqueror who forces me into submission." 65 Locke concluded this
analogy by reemphasing his objection to slavery stating unequivocally
that, "[f]rom whence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust
war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of
the conquered."'" Yet, even if one were to accept that all Africans
brought to the American colonies had been captured in "just" wars,
Locke never sanctioned the enslavement of women or children, not
even those who were the wives and sons of men conquered in "just"
wars, for he cautioned, "I am conquered; my life, it is true, as
forfeit, is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's. They made not
the war, nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit their lives, they were
161. J.LocK, supra note 29,
162. Id 1 176, at 284.
163. Id

164. Id
165. Id

166. Id

176, at 285.

22-24, at 202-03.
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6 7 In that only men who had been captured in
not mine to forfeit.""
a "just" war could be made slaves, American slavery then, from the
beginning, should have existed only as a one-generation
phenomenon, for Locke stood adamantly opposed to perpetual
slavery. Thus in the Treatises, Locke, again, emphasized that the
children of the conquered must remain free:

[C]hildren, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are
free men, and the absolute power of the conqueror reaches
no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by
him, and dies with them; and should he govern them as slaves,
subjected to his absolute, arbitrary power, he has no such right
or dominion over their children . .

.

.and he has no lawful

authority, whilst force, and not choice, compels them to
submission."6
Thus, not only was Locke opposed to perpetual slavery, he was
also opposed to inheritable slavery. As the following passage shows,
Locke reiterated his opposition to the enslavement of any but those
involved in a "just" war, conceding that, "[tlhe conqueror, if he have
a just cause, has a despotical right over the persons of all that
actually aided and concurred in the war against him, and a right to
'
make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates."'
Cautioning that slavery can never extend further than that
individual, Locke emphasized that, "[o]ver the rest of the people, if
there were any that consented not to the war, and over the children
of the captives themselves .. . he [the conqueror] has no power,

and so can have, by virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to
dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity."170
Thus, while the enslavement of individuals captured in "just"
wars might have been absolute, nowhere in the Treatises did Locke
" ' Since Locke
ever propose that slavery be perpetual or inheritable.17
had specifically denounced the enslavement of women and
children," without continuous slave importations, then, American
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id
183, at 289.
Id V 189, at 291.
Id 1 196, at 293.
Id 1 196, at 293-94.
See generally J. LocKF, supra note 29.
Id V 183, at 288-89.
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slavery, within Locke's construct, would have been strictly a onegeneration phenomenon, resting solely on the enslavement of
African men alone. It was not! Most importantly, within the
context of Locke's argument that women could not be made slaves,
the only status that should have descended to black children was
freedom. In Colonial America, the enslavement of black children
thus represented the most reprehensible abrogation of common law
presumptions, which is that "the law aids minors.""
In Revolutionary War America the colonists could hardly, in
good faith, use the argument that their enslavement of blacks was
justified on the basis that they had been captured in a "just" war.
Few traders on the West African coast and even fewer purchasers
of slaves in the American colonies knew or even concerned
themselves with the circumstances under which those Africans had
become victims of trade. 4 Even fewer would have been be in a
position to determine, if indeed, an African had been conquered,
whether or not that conflict constituted a "just" war, as opposed to
one that was "unjust," as a basis for enslavement. Even in those
instances, when English and American slave traders on the African
coast instigated war themselves for the express purpose of capturing
Africans for enslavement, their belligerence could hardly fall within
the context of Locke's definition of a "just" war.
By the 1730s, among the leading thinkers of the Enlightenment,
the "just" war rationale as a justification for enslavement was viewed
as absurd. 75 Even in the colonies, among the more enlightened
thinkers, and Thomas Jefferson is representative of that group, few
asserted that the Africans brought to America had been conquered
in a "just" war or even consented to their enslavement. 6 In the
passage deleted from the Declaration of Independance, Jefferson
said:
[H]e [George III] has waged cruel war against human nature
itself, violating it's most sacred rights of life [and] liberty in
the persons of a distant people who never offended him,
173. BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 822 (5th ed. 1979) (Ler succumt minoribus).
174. See P. FIMKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 211-16 (1985) (cited in Hall, The
Constitution And Race: A Critical Perspective, 5 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. Ris. 229, 263 n.109
(1988)).
175. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 45.
176. Id at 46.
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captivating [and] carrying them into slavery in another
hemisphere or to incur miserable death in their transportation
thither. [T]his piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel
powers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain.
[D]etermined to keep open a market where MEN should be
bought [and] sold ... "
The objections to the inclusion of this passage in the
Declaration of Independance are well-known, and for reasons that
had nothing to with whether or not Africans brought to the
American colonists had been captured in a "just" war. As Jefferson
said in his Notes,"'a that passage was deleted, "in complaisance to
South Carolina [and] Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain
the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to
'
continue it."179

Jefferson further explained the objections of the

Northern colonies to that passage noting that, "our Northern
brethren also I believe felt a little tender under those censures; for
tho' their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had been
pretty considerable carriers of them to others."'"
While one
observer viewed this passage as representative of "one of the
unhappy legacies of British oppression,""'1 he too conceded the
extent to which New England's economy was dependant on the
institution, noting that, "[olne should add that New England's own
prosperity and equalitarian society had been nourished by the
carrying trade with the slave isles of the Carribean."' 1 At the time
of the Revolution, slavery was still economically important to the
New England colonies, including Massachusetts, which
alone could boast sixty distilleries producing rum, the export
of which provided the region with its chief supply of specie.
And if Massachusetts contained no more than five thousand
Negro slaves, its West Indian trade employed some ten
177. A.L. HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., supra note 52, at 381. See also G. WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDANCE (1978).
178. T. JEFFERSON, Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, reprinted in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760-1776, at 309 (J.P. Boyd ed. 1950).
179. Id at 314.
180. Id at 314-15.
181. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 273.
182. Id at 262.
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thousand seamen, to say nothing of the workers who built,
outfitted, and supplied the ships.1"
Historians thus acknowledge, that by deleting this passage,
Jefferson not only avoided condemning slave traders in colonial New
England, but also left the door open for the continuation of the
slave trade once independance was achieved."l From the colonists'
perspective too, had that passage been included, it would have
underscored the glaring inconsistency of a nation fighting for
freedom while holding members of their community in slavery.
Perhaps, most importantly, Jefferson was doing all he could "to
avoid saying anything that would commit the signers, so many of
whom held slaves themselves, to abolition."" The more basic issue,
however, particularly within the context of race, slavery, and the
1787 Constitution, is the legitimacy claimed by the Americans under
Locke's social contract theory to maintain the institution of slavery.
Notwithstanding that claim, American blacks had not been
legitimately enslaved; this illegitimate enslavement should have been
the basis for slavery's demise.
Thus, while Locke sanctioned the enslavement of men
conquered in a "just" war, clearly American-born Africans, the first
generation descendants and beyond, had never been conquered in
any war and most certainly did not consent to their enslavement.
Ignoring those distinctions in their own economic interest, the
colonists rationalized their justification for the enslavement of blacks,
men, women, and children through the following adage offered by
Locke. Here he carefully distinguished between a servant who,
"gives the master but temporary power over him" and a slave." The
significance of this passage from the Treatises is that it established
the basis for the American revolutionists to sanction slavery, while
excluding blacks from reciprocal benefits inherent in the social
contract:
[S]laves, who being captives taken in a just war are, by the
right of Nature, subjected to the absolute dominion and
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id
Id at 164-84.
D. ROBINSON. supra note 18, at 82-83.
J. LOcKF, supra note 29, 85, at 233.
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arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say,
forfeited their lives and, with it, their liberties, and lost their
estates, and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any
property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of
civil society, the chief end whereof is the preservation of
property."l 7
The colonists' endorsement of this view of slavery had
repercussions for Afro-Americans far beyond that of excluding them
from the social contract: they were denied access to property. As
Locke said, the purpose of the social contract was that men united
for "the mutual preservation of their property" which included their
"lives, liberties, and estates."'" Yet, in the face of pernicious racism,
few distinctions existed between slaves and free blacks, particularly
when it came to securing property for profit. And Locke had
stressed the difficulty men have in preserving their property when
excluded from equal participation in an organized society under a
social contract.1 89
Despite Locke's inclusion of property as an inalienable right
and his insistence that "government has no other end but the
preservation of property,""9 Jefferson, in the Declaration of
Independence, substituted Locke's "property" for the "pursuit of
happiness." ' In answering the question, then, as to why Jefferson
made that substitution, one writer provided the following
perspectives: "Jefferson wanted eloquent symbols in his democratic
manifesto, and stylistic sensibility alone might have made him prefer
the phrase 'the pursuit of happiness' over the uninspiring and
legalistic term 'property.""' Then, giving consideration to the preRevolutionary War class structure in which wealth was inequitably
distributed, a more pragmatic reason for the deletion of property
has been postulated: "Jefferson knew that the country would soon
be asking loyal support of those without property as well as those
with it, just as he knew that American Tories, who had refused to
187. Id
188. Id

85, at 233-34.
222, at 306-07.

189. See id. 1 120, at 254; If 138, at 264-65.
190. Id 1 94, at 239-40.
191. The Declaration of Independence 2 (U.S. 1776).
192. A. KOCH. POWER, MORALS, AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 28 (1961).
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join the patriot ranks, might have their property confiscated."'"
The issue of property had consequences beyond private
interests.
British imperial challenges could compromise the
sovereign integrity of the colonies and their future as independent
states. It has been said, in explaining Jefferson's substitution from
this perspective, that there was also his "concern to avoid an appeal
to property on the eve of the repudiation of Great Britain's
complicated claims that the colonies, founded on the basis of royal
grants in many case, were and should remain her property."1"
Another factor must also be considered when looking at the
omission of property in the Declaration of Independence. Within
the literal meaning of Locke's Treatises, blacks should never have
been enslaved. They, too, were entitled to inalienable rights, which
would have included property, had they also been accorded their
freedom in Revolutionary War America for, as Locke said, men
enter society "with an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse)."195

Yet Colonial America had thrived on slave labor and Locke
had tied property to labor. And, black labor had produced wealth,
not only for the owners of slaves but also for those whose business
interests were tied to the marketing of slave-produced goods, the
carrying trade in slaves, and the provisioning of slave societies."9
In an agrarian-based economy, the liberation of blacks, one
fifth of the nation's population,"' particularly during the
Revolutionary War Era, would have upset the basis, as well as the
balance of wealth in the new nation. As Locke stated, "whatsoever
another gets from me by force, I still retain the rights of, and he is
obliged presently to restore."' ' If unshackled from their chains of
slavery and racism, able to compete freely and equally, Afro193. Id
194. A. KOCH, supra note 192, at 28.
195. J. LocKE, supra note 29, 131, at 258.
196. A great majority of slaves were agricultural laborers. R.W. FOGEL & S.L. ENGERMAN,
TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 3941 (1974). Their
work included the planting, raising, and harvesting of virtually every type of crop including
cotton, tobacco, sugar, rice, and hemp. Id Some slaves were skilled craftsmen (blacksmiths,
carpenters and coopers). Id. Others were engaged in semi-skilled and domestic jobs
(teamsters, coachmen, gardners, stewards, house servants, seamstresses, and nurses). Id.
197. See supra note 14.

198. J. LOCKE, supra note 29, 1 186, at 290-91.
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Americans would have proved to be as capable as whites in
developing the resources of the new land.'"
The development of chattel slavery, however, provided a basis
for colonial whites to deprive blacks from acquiring property,
notwithstanding Locke's unqualified assertion that with all men
"being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of
Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us
that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made
for one another's uses."'
Enslaved and precluded from acquiring
property, Afro-Americans were denied the means by which they
could have participated on an equal basis with whites in the
production of any significant amount of personal wealth.
A society which legally sanctions slavery can deny economic
freedom to an individual whom it defines as a slave, and thus deny
the individual the right to pursue the property interest inherent in
his own labor power. The rationale for this denial is simply that a
slave's economic freedom represents a deprivation of the liberty of
another. As American common law developed, the individual who
held ownership rights in a slave was also entitled to the value
derived from that person's labor under the statutory protection of
private property?"1 In a discussion of the constitutional protection
of economic interests, one writer said, "[tlhe most conspicuous lack
of economic freedom is to be found where slavery exists."' Chattel
slavery as it developed in Colonial America thus represented a
deprivation of the slave's right to property inherent in his life,
liberty, and labor power, that is, the right to obtain a living through
the use of his own property.
First in Colonial America and then in Revolutionary War
199. See Walker, Racism, Slavery and Free Enterprise:Black Entrepreneurshipand Business
EnterpriseBefore the Civil War, 60 Bus. HIST. REV. 343 (1983), who said, "the most distinctive
feature of the American free enterprise system, access to and protection of private property,
was also the most important factor allowing blacks, slave and free, to participate in the
antebellum economy as entrepreneurs." 1d at 377.
200. . LOCKE, supra note 29, 1 6, at 194.
201. See WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 58-59.
202. R.L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING
POWER 189 (1952), who said: "Laws which work to anyone's economic disadvantage are
nowadays frequently challenged as deprivations of liberty or property, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 197. Since the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, economic disadvantages have been linked to employment discrimination under the
equality of the law provision of the fourteenth amendment. See D.A. BELL, JR., RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 591-94 (1980).
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America, the protection of private property was paramount,
notwithstanding that labor in itself was a property right, neither
mutually exclusive to nor inseparable from an individual's right to
life. Consequently, it was not just Jefferson's substitution of "the
pursuit of happiness" in place of John Locke's "property" that
compromised the integrity of the Revolution and the egalitarian
principles on which it was based. Again, American common law, in
its development, was compromised, as seen in the legal definition of
property derived from Blackstone, which conjoined property not
only with consent but also with contract.' Afro-Americans neither
consented to nor contracted for their enslavement. Yet, under the
American constitutional precept of legality, with its emphasis on the
protection of private property, the Framers sought to reconcile
slavery with liberty, notwithstanding that contracts receive legal
sanction only from the agreement of the parties. Most importantly,
no contract is born of wrong doing.' However, slavery nullified the
right of Afro-Americans to contract to promote their own economic
advancement by making them chattel property. Blacks were placed
outside the social contract by the Framers in the 1787 Constitution.
This failure to secure racial equality served equally well in depriving
blacks, both slave and free, of what is considered a basic human
right. To live one's life with dignity, accomplished through the
consent of the individual to the use of his own labor power for
value beyond subsistence, is paramount.
Had Lockean principles been strictly applied to provide liberty
for blacks, as they had been to legitimate the Revolution and to
provide the basis for liberal American constitutionalism, then AfroAmerican slavery should have been abolished with blacks being
accorded the freedom and legal status of whites. With the
construction of American law, slaves were property; non-slave blacks
were not. In either case, Locke's endorsement of the right of men
to profit from their labor would have provided blacks with a basis
to acquire property had they been accorded full and equal status
with whites. 5
Thus, while Jefferson failed to include property in his triad of
inalienable rights, the protection of private property became the
203. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1-23 (1803).
204. 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTS §19, at 35 (3d ed. 1957).
205. See J. LocKE, supra note 29, 1 27, at 204.
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foundation of the new nation under the Constitution.' The tragic
consequence for the nation, then, is that the new Americans
legitimated their Revolution on the basis of Locke's social contract
philosophy.
With a moral imperative for freedom, which
pronounced the equality of men, the Framers then incorporated
their manifesto for independence in the 1787 Constitution to protect
their inalienable rights to the exclusion of blacks. What was viewed
as economic necessity, a response to the vast expanse of land and
the scarcity of labor, encouraged the development of involuntary
hereditary labor based on race. Racism thus developed as the basis
to justify the exclusion of blacks from participation in the body
politic of the new nation.'
Within the context of Locke's social contract theory and his
assertion of the equality of men, it is evident that the Treatises
provided no basis upon which the American colonists could justify
slavery or the exclusion of blacks from participation as equals in the
new nation. In itself, the perpetuation of slavery reflected not only
an economic basis but also the persistence of racism which had
intensified by the time of the American Revolution.'
That the
infamous paragraph deleted from the Declaration of Independence
concluded with the following indictment is revealing in the blatant
acknowledgement that freedom for black Americans would not be
a goal of the Founding Fathers, once independence had been
achieved.' As Jefferson said following his denunciation of the slave
trade, "he [George III] is now exciting those very people to-rise in
arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has
deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he also obtruded
them: thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties
of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against
'210
the lives of another.
In its entirety, the deleted section is remarkable for its
appalling hypocrisy. Jefferson denounced the English for the
horrors perpetrated on blacks because of the slave trade, while at
the same time assailed what he considered their affrontery for
206. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

207. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 276-80.
208. Id at 91-98.
209. See supra note 177, and accompaning text.
210. T. JEFFERSON, supra note 178, at 318.

1989]

RACE AND THE CONSTITUTION

providing blacks with the means to secure freedom. Whatever the
horrors and brutality of slavery caused by the trade, that AfroAmericans should have been free from their involuntary servitude
seemed far removed from the consciousness of those who profited
most from their lifetime labor. But more than just the economics
of slavery, racial prejudices underscored the white American
apprehension of liberty and equality for the black American. As he
indicated, Jefferson was fearful of what he perceived as racial
retaliation if blacks achieved freedom:
Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten
thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have
sustained; new provocations; the real distinction which nature
has made; and many other cirumstances, will divide us into
parties, and produce convulsions which will probably never end
but in the extermination of the one or the other race.--To
these objections, which are political, may be added others,
which are physical and moral.21'
Consequently, in response to the perennial historical question
as to whether Jefferson's Declaration of Independence applied to
blacks, or, more specifically, as one scholar has asked: "Did
Jefferson's self-evident truths contain an implicit racial exception?
Did the lines, properly read in the light of American social
conditions
of 1776, contain the word 'white' before the word
'men'?" 12 His response was that "[c]ontemporaneous and later
events in Jefferson's state suggested that they did."21a
Locke's Treatises had provided the philosophical basis of protest
found in the Declaration of Independence.214 The principles of
freedom inherent in that document found protection in the 1787
Constitution and the subsequent 1791 Bill of Rights.2"5 AfroAmericans claimed that their inalienable rights also should have
211. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138 (W. Peden ed. 1955).
212.

W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-

1848, at 51 (1977). See also Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the
Declarationof Independenceand the Meeting of the PhiladelphiaConvention, 30 AM. HIST. REV.
511 (1925).
213. W. WIECEK, supra note 212, at 51.
214. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 289.
215. U.S. CONsT. amends. I-X.
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found protection under the new government. But, they were not!
The 1787 Constitution sanctioned slavery while obscuring the issue
of the status of non-slave blacks. The debate over whether the
social contract should apply to blacks continued for six decades. In
1857, the Dred Scott16 decision pronounced the position of the
Federal government, which until then had remained silent in theory
although not in action, on that issue. Consequently, in response to
the question of whether or not the statement in the Declaration of
Independence "all men are created equal"21 applied only to white
men, Chief Justice Roger Taney responded emphatically that it did,
emphasizing:
[I]t is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race
were not intended to be included, and formed no part of
the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if
the language, as understood in that day, would embrace
them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the
Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and
flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted...
. Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men-high in literary acquirements .

. .

. They spoke and acted

according to the then established doctrines and principles
218

By 1760, during the early years of the Revolutionary War era,
the ideas of Montesquieu t 9 and Francis Hutcheson' flourished and
"were being repeated, developed and propagated by the cognoscenti
216. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
217. The Declaration of Independence
2 (U.S. 1776).
218. Dred Scot; 60 U.S. at 410. See also D.E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCoTr CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND PoLmcs (1978); P. FINKELMAN, supra note 174.

219. Montesquieu was a French political philosopher who examined the political, social, and
economic history of antiquity, and denounced the institution of slavery. See L. LEVIN, THE
POLmCAL DOCrMNE OF MoNTEsQUImus EsP Rrr DES Lois 250-61 (1936). He was opposed
to the concepts that slavery was in accord with the natural law and an economic necessity,
and believed that slavery imperiled the principles of democracy. Id
220. Francis Hutcheson argued that "nothing was so 'effectual' as perpetual bondage in
promoting industry and restraining sloth, especially in the 'lower conditions' of society." AGE

OF REVOLUTnON, supra note 8, at 263 (quoting F. HUTCHESON, 2 A SYSTEM OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 202 (1755)). He argued that "slavery should be the 'ordinary punishment' of such
idle vagrants." Id at 264. However, his dominant ideology was that the utilitarian state
should be at least nominally free. See WESrERN CULTURE, supra note 18, at 375-78.

1989]

RACE AND THE CONSTITUTION

of the enlightened world."'" Montesquieu, regarded as the most
influential political analyst of the day, denounced slavery and
emphasized virtue as the basic operating principle of government.'
He, "more than any other thinker . . . put the subject of Negro

slavery on the agenda of the European Enlightenment."'
Moreover, if Jefferson's deleted passage is representative of the
thinking of the American colonists, then the Revolutionary War
generation also understood, within Locke's context of slavery, that
the Africans enslaved in the American colonies had been victims of
an "unjust" or "cruel war" waged against them by people whom they
never offended, which included not only the English, but themselves
as well. In the Treatises, Locke had carefully outlined his theory of
slavery, which could be sustained only when the conquered had been
captured in a "just" war. Otherwise, as Locke said, "it is plain that
he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the
subjection and obedience to the conquered."'
Yet, just as the founding fathers had reshaped Locke's
philosophy to support the Revolution, they again extrapolated what
was necessary from the Treatises to lay the foundation for the new
government. Locke reasoned that people unite into commonwealths
under government, mainly for the protection of their property.'
Specifically, once ties with England had been severed the new
Americans were determined that there would be no obstacles to
their economic growth, which from the Colonial period on, had
been contingent upon the existence of slavery. Protecting the
institution in those areas where slave labor was the bedrock of the
economy, then, was foremost. Thus Locke's insistence that the end
of government is the goal of mankind and "the end of law is not to
abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom,"' was
siezed upon by the Revolutionaries to justify their construction of
221. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 45.
222. See supra note 219.
223. AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 8, at 45. See also C. ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTHCENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT AND
CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II
UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE 13 COLONIES (1959).
224. J.LOCKE, supra note 29, V 176, at 285.
225. J.LOCKE, supra note 29, 1 134, at 260.
226. Id 1 57, at 219.
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a new government at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. 7 Since
slavery had provided the basis to justify the exclusion of all blacks
from the social contract, blacks were also denied their inalienable
rights: hence, equality under the law with whites.'
Denied
protection of the law, blacks, standing outside the 1787 Constitution,
existed in a state of tyranny, for as Locke said, "[w]herever law ends,
tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another's harm. '
In drafting the 1787 Constitution, the Framers produced a body
of laws that relegated the great masses of black Americans to
unconditional slavery until the Civil War's promise of freedom.'
With the Declaration of Independence, "[t]he American Revolution
introduced an egalitarian rhetoric to an unequal society .... But

the men who subscribed to the Declaration in 1776 did not feel
themselves thereby mandated to transform American life." 1 Nor
did the Framers, whose political agenda at the 1787 Constitutional
Convention reflected that of
English philosopher James
Harrington's"2 construction of property as opposed to Locke's. As
John Adams said, "Harrington has shown that power always follows
property. This I believe to be as infallible a maxim in politics, as
that action and reaction are equal, is in mechanics." 3 Slaves were
property! Thus, the issue of slavery in the Constitution, within the
context of property, was of both political and economic concern to
227. See H. VON HoLsT,supra note 22, at 218.

228. See W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 123-26.
229. J.LOCKE, supra note 29, 1 202, at 297.
230. The overthrow of slavery in the United States was accomplished by the Civil War
(1861-65). W. ALEXANDER, HISTORY OF THE COLORED RACE IN AMERICA 537 (1968). It
received its death blow from the Emancipation Proclamation of President Lincoln on January
1, 1863. Id This led to the adoption of the thirteenth (1865), fourteenth (1868), and
fifteenth (1870) amendments, added to the Constitution of the United States so that human
slavery was finally and forever put to rest in this country. Id at 538.
231. J.R. POLE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
232. James Harrington was an English political philosopher whose major work, THE

COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA was a restatement of Aristotle's theory of constitutional stablity
and revolution. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANICA 718 (15th ed. 1985). He advocated the division
of the country into landholdings of a specified maximum value. Id His ideas are said to be
responsible for such United States political developments as written constitutions, bicameral
legislatures, and the indirect election of the president. Id
233. 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

376 (C.F.

Adams ed. 1850-1856). See aLso J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 395 (1975);
A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUEMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977); P. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA'S

FIRST POLITICAL ECONOMISTS 225 (1980).
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the Founding Fathers.
National interest dictated that the institution would not be
abolished in the southern states where it was most profitable. Thus,
northern states provided for the emancipation of their slaves, either
through gradual manumission laws,' loose construction of their state
constitutions2 5 or judicial decisions. 2' In addition, Congress had
made provisions that ruled against the expansion of slavery in the
Northwest under the 1787 Ordinance. 7 Thus, while precedent
existed in the state constitutions in the North and a federal law was
in force which limited that institution in the new northwestern
territories, slavery found protection under the new federal
Constitution.' While the Framers avoided use of the term slavery
in the 1787 Constitution, records of the debates at that convention
reveal that the Framers dealt openly and explicitly with slavery and

its ramifications for the new nation. 9 From those discussions, it is
difficult to suggest that they found protection of the institution
234. New York gradually abolished slavery through its manumission law of 1799. A.
ZILVERSMrr, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 208
(1967). In 1777, Connecticut passed a bill making it easier to manumit slaves. Id at 122.
Virginia revised its slave code in the 1780's allowing benevolent masters to manumit slaves.
Id at 155.
235. In 1817, New York adopted the New York Abolition Law which provided for the
emancipation of approximately 10,000 slaves. Id. at 213-14. New Jersey passed an act to
abolish slavery in 1846. Id at 220. Connecticut followed suit in 1848. Id. at 202.
236. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836); Lemmon v. People,
20 N.Y. 562 (1860); State v. Lasselle, 1 Blackf. 60 (Ind. 1820). See generally A. ZILVERSMrr,
supra note 234; Fogel & Engerman, Philanthropyat Bargain P'ces: Notes on the Economics
of Gradual Emancipation, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1974), who argued that the value of the
labor of nothern slaves subsidized the cost of their freedom, with some owners making a
profit by selling their slaves in the South. Id at 393.
237. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest
of the River Ohio (Northwest Ordinance), ch. 8, art. VI, 1 Stat. 50, 53 (1789). See P. ONUF,
STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORmHwnsr ORDINANCE (1987); THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK (R.M. Taylor, Jr. ed. 1987).
238. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
239. See generally 1 1787, DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTrUTION (W.E. Benton ed. 1986)
[hereinafter DRAFTING], which traces each article and section of the 1787 Constitution through
the records of the convention, May 14 - Sept. 17, 1787, from the notes of some of the
delegates and from official documents, including convention committee reports. See also 1-3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1966); Anderson, The
Intention of the Framers:A Note on ConstitutionalInterpretation,49 AM. POL SCI. REV. 340,
343 (1955); Roche, The FoundingFathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL Sci. REV.
799 (1961); C. RosSrrER, 1787, THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966); R.B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT
THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTTTION 212 (1985). For
biographical information, economic interests and voting of the constitutional convention
delegates mentioned herein see F. McDoNALD, supra note 2, at 38-110.
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incompatible with the liberal political principles of government
structured in their Constitution.
While the institution found support, either directly or indirectly,
in several sections of the 1787 Constitution,m three sections of that
document specifically applied to slavery.4
The three sections
specifically related to slavery are presented below with comments
from notes taken at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, primarily
by Madison. 2 Particularly striking in those discussions is the open
acknowledgement and acceptance of the slave as property and the
cool objectivity of the Framers in detaching the humanity of the
slave from his status as property. Under the pretext of legality,
both liberty and equality for blacks were subordinated in the interest
of compromise to the southern states for their support of the 1787
Constitution. 3 Reinforcing the legal status of slaves as property,
while finding the most productive way to promote and protect the
economic interests inherent in slaves as property, were issues that
were also resolved in the 1787 Constitution, as seen in the
discussion of those provisions at the Constitutional Convention:2 "
ARTICLE I, Section 2: Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to service [slaves] for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.'
MR. PINCKNEY [moved to make] . . . 'blacks equal to

whites in the ratio of representation.' This, he urged, was
more than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants
of the Southern States: they are as productive of pecuniary
resources as those of the Northern States. They add equality
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. IV, § 3; art. IV, § 4. See infra notes 278-95 and
accompanying text.
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; art. 1, § 9; art. IV, § 2.
242. J. MADISON, NoES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (A. Koch
intro. 1966 & rev. ed. 1984).
243. Id at 507-08. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 239, at 41517.
244. See H. VON HoLsr, supra note 22, at 10-20 (citing U.S. CONST art. I, § 2; art. I, § 9;
art. IV, § 2).
245. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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to the wealth, and considering money as the sinew of war,
to the strength of the nation. It would also be politic with
regard to the Northern States, as taxation is to keep pace
with Representation.'
MR. PATTERSON ....

He could regard negroe[] slaves in

no light but as property. They are no free agents, have no
personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the
contrary are themselves property, [and] like other property,
entirely at the will of the Master ....

And if Negroes are

not represented in the States to which they belong, why
should they be represented in the [General Government]..
. He was also ag[ain]st such an indirect encouragem[en]t of
the slave trade; observing that Cong[res]s . . . had been

ashamed to use the term 'slaves' [and] had substituted a
description.247
. . .suggested as a proper ground of
compromise, that in the first branch the States should be
represented according to their number of free inhabitants;
and in the [second] which had for one of its primary objects
the guardianship of property, according to the whole number,

MR. MADISON .

including slaves.'

ARTICLE 1, Section 9: The Migration or Importation of such
Persons [slaves] as any of the States now existing shall think proper
to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be
imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.m
MR. L. MARTIN, [Maryland] ....

In the first place as five

slaves are to be counted as [three] free men in the
apportionment of Representatives; such a clause [limiting the
number of representatives in the large states] w[oul]d leave
MADISON, supra note 242, at 281. See also DRAFING, supra note 239, at 389.
247. J. MADISON, supra note 242, at 259. See also DRAFTNG, supra note 239, at 368.
248. J. MADISON, supra note 242, at 259. See also DRAFnNG, supra note 239, at 368.
249. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.

246. J.
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an encouragement to this trafic. In the second place slaves
weakened one part of the Union which the other parts were
bound to protect: the privilege of importing them was
therefore unreasonable. And in the third place it was
inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and
dishonorable to the American character to have such a
feature in the Constitution.2s
MR. RUTLEDGE did not see how the importation of slaves
could be encouraged by this Section.
He was not
apprehensive of insurrections ....Religion [and] humanity
had nothing to do with this question. Interest [property]
alone is the governing principle with nations. The true
question at present is whether the South[er]n States shall or
shall not be parties to the Union. If the Northern States
consult their interest, they will not oppose the increase of
Slaves which will increase the commodities of which they will
become the carriers.?5
MR. ELLSWORTH was for leaving the clause as it stands.
[L]et every State import what it pleases. The morality or
wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States
themselves. What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the
States are the best judges of their particular interest. The old
confederation had not meddled with this point, and he did
not see any greater necessity for bringing it within the policy
2
of the new one. 2
MR. PINCKNEY. South Carolina can never receive the plan
if it prohibits the slave trade. In every proposed extension of
the powers of the Congress, that State has expressly [and]
watchfully excepted that of meddling with the importation of
negroes. If the States be all left at liberty on this subject, S.
Carolina may perhaps by degrees do of herself what is wished,
as Virginia [and] Maryland have already done.2"
250. J. MADISON,
251. 3. MADISON,
252. . MADISON,
253. . MADISON,
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supra note
supra note
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242,
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at
at
at

502.
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503.
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See
See
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also DRAFnNG,
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supra note
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239,
239,
239,
239,

at
at
at
at
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946-47.
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GENERAL PINCKNEY declared it to be his firm opinion
that if himself [and] all his colleagues were to sign the
Constitution [and] use their personal influence, it would be
of no avail towards obtaining the assent of their Constituents.
S. Carolina [and] Georgia cannot do without slaves. As to
Virginia she will gain by stopping the importations. Her
slaves will rise in value, [and] she has more than she wants.
...He contended that the importation of slaves would be for
the interest of the whole Union. The more slaves, the more
produce to employ the carrying trade; The more consumption
also, and the more of this, the more of revenue for the
common treasury ....

MR. SHERMAN said it was better to let the [Southern]
States import slaves than to part with them, if they made that
a sine qua non. He was opposed to a tax on slaves imported
as making the matter worse, because it implied they were
property.... 25
MR. MADISON. Twenty years will produce all the mischief
that can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves.
So long a term will be more dishonorable to the American
character than to say nothing about it in the Constitution." 6
MR. GOVERNEUR MORRIS was for making the clause
read at once, 'the importation of slaves into N. Carolina, S.
Carolina [and] Georgia shall not be prohibited &c.' This he
said would be most fair and would avoid the ambiguity by
which, under the power with regard to naturalization, the
liberty reserved to the States might be defeated. He wished
it to be known also that this part of the Constitution was a
compliance with those States. If the change of language
however should be objected 2to7 by the members from those
States, he should not urge it. 5
254.
255.
256.
257.

J.
J.
J.
J.

MADISON,
MADISON,
MADISON,
MADISON,
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505. See also DLAnNO, supra note 239, at 949-50.
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COL. MASON was not against using the term 'slaves' but
ag[ain]st naming N. C. S. C. [North Carolina and South
Carolina] [and] Georgia, lest it should give offence to the
people of those States. 8
MR. WILLIAMSON said that both in opinion [and] practice
he was, against slavery; but thought it more in favor of
humanity, from a view of all circumstances, to let in S. C.
[South Carolina] [and] Georgia on those terms, than to
exclude them from the Union. 9
MR. SHERMAN was ag[ain]st this [second] part, as
acknowledging men to be property, by taxing them as such
under the character of slaves.'
MR. GHORUM thought that Mr. Sherman should consider
the duty, not as implying that slaves are property, but as a
discouragement to the importation of them."
MR. SHERMAN in answer to Mr. Ghorum observed that the
smallness of the duty shewed revenue to be the object, not
the discouragement of the importation.'
MR. MADISON thought it wrong to admit in the
Constitution the idea that there could be property in men.
The reason of duties did not hold, as slaves are not like
merchandize, consumed, &c.'
MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS ....
He never would
concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious
institution. It was the curse of heaven on the States where
it prevailed ....

Upon what principle is it that the slaves

shall be computed in the representation? Are they men?..
258. J. MADISON, supra note
259. J. MADISON, supra note
260. . MADISON, supra note
261. J. MADISON, supra note
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263. J. MADISON, supra note

242,
242,
242,
242,

at
at
at
at
242, at
242, at

531.
531.
532.
532.

See also DRAFnNG,
See also DRAFING,
See also DRAFnNG,
See also DRAFING,
532. See also DRAF1rING,
532. See also DRAFnNG,

supra note 239, at 954.

supra note 239, at 955.
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

239,
239,
239,
239,

at
at
at
at

955.
955.

956.
956.

19891

RACE AND THE CONSTITUTION

. Are they property?
included? .

.

Why then is no other property

. He would add that Domestic slavery is the

most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the
proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever
been the favorite offspring of Aristocracy. And [w]hat is the
proposed compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice
of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity.
They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the
defence of the S. [Southern] States; for their defence
ag[ain]st those very slaves of whom they complain ....

On

the other side the Southern States are not to be restrained
from importing fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once
to increase the danger of attack... and are at the same time
to have their exports [and] their slaves exempt from all
contributions for the public service ....

For what then are

all these sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit
himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the U.
[United] States, than saddle posterity with such a
Constitution.'
ARTICLE IV. Section 2: No person held to Service or Labour
[slaves] in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.'
MR. BUTLER AND MR. PINCKNEY moved 'to require
fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like
criminals.' 2"
The records of the Convention show very little discussion of the
Fugitive Slave Clause, 27 which had also found support in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.2" While that document proscribed
264. J. MADISON, supra note 242, at 411-12. See also DRAFTING, supra note 239, at 942-44.
265. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
266. J. MADISON, supra note 242, at 545.
267. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.

268. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest
of the River Ohio (Northwest Ordinance), ch. 8. art. VI, 1 Stat. 50, 53 (1787).
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the establishment of the institution in the Northwest Territory, it
also required that fugitive slaves escaping to that region must be
returned, "[pirovided, always, that any person escaping into the
same, from whom labour or service is lawfully claimed in any one of
the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and
conveyed to the person claiming his or her labour or service as
aforesaid."'
Thus, while the word slave was studiously avoided in the
Constitution, precedent had been established in American law to
resort to euphemisms in those instances when custom and tradition
made legal or statutory intent clear, particularly in the instance of
slavery. In a discussion of why the term slave was avoided by the
Framers, one scholar emphasized that text must be distinguished
from purpose in interpreting the 1787 Constitution, explaining that
"[t]he law inheres most essentially in the text of the document, not
in the purposes of those who wrote the document, although the
27 In this
purposes may be consulted to illuminate obscure meaning.""
instance, as seen within the context of the notes of the
constitutional debates on slavery, the intent of the Framers, with few
objections, was to protect the institution. Interestingly, when
promoting a positive good, as in the case of the Northwest
Ordinance, our lawmakers found little difficulty in explicitly referring
to the term slavery, as that document said, "[t]here shall be neither
2 71
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory.
The issue suggested then, is not that the word slave was omitted
from the 1787 Constitution, because the Founding Fathers "were
trying to frame two constitutions, one for their own time and the
other for the ages."'2 To accept that rationale, one would have to
explain the constitutional silence of the Framers regarding the legal
recognition of free blacks. One would also have to explain, within
the context of judicial review, limitations in the construction of the
fourteenth"r and fifteenth 4 amendments when applied to blacks in
269. Id
270. D.E. FENRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLmCS 15 (1981).
271. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest

of the River Ohio (Northwest Ordinance), ch. 8, art. VI, I Stat. 50, 53 (1787).
272. D.E. FENRENBACHER, supra note 270, at 15.
273. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
274. U.S. CONST amend. XV.
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the 1883, Civil Rights Cases,Z'5 the 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson case'
and the 1898, Williams v. Mississippi case.'" Inevitably, the reality
of American constitutional liberalism must also be perceived from
that of the Afro-American, not only today in 1989, but also in 1787.
Presumably, the ultimate purpose of the 1787 Constitution was
to protect and preserve liberty in the face of the abuses of political
power. The Afro-American, however, was excluded by law, custom,
and tradition from the American polity. To deny their status openly
in the supreme law of the land would challenge the egalitarian
imperative that legitimated the Revolution. Most importantly, it
would raise the spectre, the possibility, that constitutionally
protected slavery of blacks could establish a precedent, which might
not preclude instituting political slavery for whites.
As previously noted, though only three provisions in the 1787
Constitution specifically referred to slavery, several other provisions,
singly or combined, had either a direct or indirect impact in
protecting the institution of slavery. In Article I, both sections 2
and 9 provided for direct taxes, which prevented Congress from
imposing a head tax on slaves which could have served to encourage
their emancipation. 8 Then, there were two provisions in the
Constitution which provided for the suppression of slave
insurrections: Article 1, section 8, gave Congress the power "[t]o
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 7 and, Article IV,
section 4, required that, "[tjhe United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened), against domestic Violence."'
Then, to prevent the federal government from levying an
indirect tax on slavery, Article I, sections 9 and 10 prohibited both
275. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
276. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
277. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1896). See also the following as they relate,
respectively, to the fourteenth amendment, deprivation of civil rights, and fifteenth amendment

voting rights for blacks: Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1872); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
278. U.S. CONSr. art. I, §§ 2, 9.

279. Id. § 8.
280. Id. art. IV, § 4.
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federal and state governments from imposing taxes on exports, 2S'
which included slave-produced commodities. Moreover, the federal
government had the power to contain slavery in the states where it
existed under both Article I, section 8, which gave Congress the
power to regulate interstate commerce,' as well as in Article IV,
section 3, which gave Congress the right to admit new states and to
"make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States.m
Also, under Article I, section 8, which gave Congress the power
to establish a uniform rule on naturalization,'
the Federal
government had the power to override property concerns in slaves
and declare them citizens subject to all the privileges and immunities
of citizenship.'
The Framers were, however, men of their own
times and could not conceive of the existence of a free society
unless, under law, the government's ability to confiscate private
property was limited.' While the status of black slaves as chattel
property was ingrained in the customs, values, and common law
traditions of American society, more than a revolution in national
consciousness was necessary to abolish the institution. Simply put,
the 1787 Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, had
sanctioned what use and custom had approved: Jus vendit quod usus
approbavit.s27
Moreover, in guaranteeing to the states a republican form of
government' and relegating those powers not expressly delegated
to the federal government to the states,' slavery later found
protection under the 1787 Constitution. Statutory laws in states
where slavery continued after 1787 provide "probably the best single
means of ascertaining what a society thinks behavior ought to be;
they sweep up the felt necessities of the day and indirectly expound
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
Id. § 8.
Id. art. IV, § 3.
Id. art. 1, § 8.

285. Id.
286. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend V.
287. The english translation is: The law dispenses what use has approved.

DICrONARY 779 (5th ed. 1979).
288. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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the social norms of the legislators."' It is hard to perceive that the
Framers, which included nineteen slaveholders out of the fifty-five
delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, 1 despite their lofty
aims, had not embraced those norms. Not only did they legalize the
status of slave4 as property, but they also profited from their labor,
despite the anguish that it brought to their souls. James Madison,
a slaveholder and considered the "father of the Constitution,"'
pronounced what he perceived as the national consensus of the legal
status of the slave:
But we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely
as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true
state of the case is that they partake of both these qualities:
being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons,
and in other respects as property. In being compelled to
labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by
one master to another master; and in being subject at all
times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body,
by the capricious will of another -the slave may appear to be
degraded from the human rank, and classed with those
irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of
property. In being protected,... against the violence of all

others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in
being punishable himself for all violence committed against
others--the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as
a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational
creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property.
The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the
mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact
their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by
the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that
290. W.D. JORDAN, supra note 6, at 588. See also Walker, The Legal Status of Free Blacks
in Early Kentucky, 1792-1825, 57 FILSON CLUB HiST. Q. 382 (1983).
291. Delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention who were slaveholders included

James Madison, see 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRTANNICA 657 (15th ed. 1985); George Washington,
see 29 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 720 (15th ed. 1985); John Rutledge, see 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 264 (15th ed. 1985); Charles Pinckney see 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA 448 (15th
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these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the
pretext that the laws have transformed the Negroes into
subjects of property that a place is disputed them in the
computation of numbers; and it is admitted that if the laws
were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the
Negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of
representation with the other inhabitants ....
... Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be

mutually adopted which regards them as inhabitants, but as
debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants;
which regards the slave as divested of two fifths of the man. 3
Thus, when one considers how the Constitution protected the
institution of slavery, it must be conceded that the humanity of the
slave was made subordinate to the interests of white America. That
the delegates at the 1787 Constitution could have provided freedom
and civil liberties for the Afro-American remains moot in face of the
politics of union, protection of private property, and the interests of
the national economy. All took precedence over any consideration
of the abolition of slavery. Inevitably, laws are enacted to embody,
preserve, and enforce societal values. When the 1787 Constitution
is considered within the context of the profit-oriented market system
which paced America's economic growth, doubtless, "[t]he limitation
of successful legal coercion in the economic sphere lies in the
relative proportion of strength of private economic interests on the
one hand and interests promoting conformance to the rules of law
on the other. The inclination to forego economic opportunity
simply in order to act legally is obviously slight."' In this instance,
laws conformed to societal practices. If the 1787 Constitution was
to succeed as the supreme law of the land, and if the new nation
was going to be distinguished by a rule of law, then the inclusion of
laws which could neither be enforced nor promote a "more perfect
union" would have defeated the legal authority of that document.
Moreover, ratification required that the new Constitution intrude
upon individual liberties as little as possible, which included
293. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 326, 337-39 (J.Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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safeguarding property and other economic interests from
infringement by both the federal and state governments.
The ultimate reality, the imperative that sustained slavery, that
denied liberty and equality to Afro-Americans, that actuated legality
as the basis of American constitutionalism in the Revolutionary War
era then, was the desire of the Framers to avoid compromising
those historic conditions which, if allowed to persist, might continue
to promote the building of a strong national economy. Thus, while
the Founding Fathers might feel a moral apprehension, might even
ignore or deny the reality, that the federal Constitution protected
slavery, doubtless the perpetuation of the institution was paramount.
Slavery's continued existence obviously was neither viewed as
antithetical to republican principles of government any more than
the denial of liberty and equality to twenty percent of the nation's
population represented a monumental contradiction to the forces
of Enlightenment which were used to justify the Revolution.
Thus, in 1787, legality, under the guise of American
constitutionalism, obscured the issue of race, while endorsing the
expansion of slavery, which not only encouraged racial inequalities,
but limited the economic achievements of blacks had they been able
to participate equally in the development of the nation's wealth.
What one must recognize, then, is the extent to which whites could
define their freedom, as well as determine the limits of their
economic opportunities in this nation, which was accomplished
largely by the degree to which blacks were denied liberty, equality,
and property under the guise of legality, the sine qua non of
American constitutional liberalism. Thus, while an attempt was
made to establish a laissez-faire, capitalist economic system, "the
Constitution was not a victory of capitalism over slavery, but a
compromise between capitalism and slavery."'
In Revolutionary War America, mercantilism, the use of state
action to promote national economic growth, ultimately proved the
impetus for the colonists to push for economic self-determination
through national independence. In constructing the economic
agenda for the new nation, agricultural development figured as
prominently as the promotion of American commerce and industry,
295. S. LYND, supra note 17, at 136, 155-56. See also S. LYND, INTELLEcruAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN RADICALISM (1968). America, a property-loving nation has used "radical means
to achieve conservative ends." J.DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN PoLmcs 4 (1984).
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particularly since, "[t]o a large degree it may be said that Americans
bought their independence with slave labor."'
Considering the
American historical experience from 1619 to 1787 within the context
of the 1787 Constitution, perhaps the intent of the Framers was to
sustain that independence, both political and economic, through
slave labor. Slavery would also protect the societal status of white
Americans through a perpetuation of the subordinate status of
blacks. In a racist slave society, underscored by capitalism, propelled
by private initiative, and resting on the protection of private
property, the legal and societal status of Afro-Americans, both
implied and expressed, in the 1787 Constitution, was as much a
reflection of the achievement of doctrinaire mercantilist principles
as it was of the absence of egalitarian laissez-faire economic goals.'
Despite what in retrospect might be perceived as the libertarian
intent of the American Revolution, even when viewed within the
construct of a loose interpretation of the 1787 Constitution, legality
as opposed to equality, and the protection of private property,
particularly in slaves, obviated the issue of freedom for blacks in
the new nation.
Consequently, today, few serious students of the Afro-American
historical experience accept the illusion that in Revolutionary War
America, equality and freedom for blacks in the new nation could
be achieved under the 1787 Constitution. The events which took
place between 1776 and 1787, must be recognized not only as
colonial war, but also as a civil war in which white Americans
fought, not for the acquisition of some previously denied freedoms,
but rather for the retention of what was viewed as their existing
freedoms as Englishmen. In the final analysis, one reaches the
conclusion in reviewing the American Revolution that the "inherent
conservatism" of the war must be recognized as well as the fact that
that the denial of liberty and equality to blacks limited the
revolutionary potential of the American War for Independence.
296. E.S. MORGAN, supra note 1, at 5.
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With the 1787 Constitution, the failure of the Framers to
sanction the destruction of slavery and to provide liberty and
equality for all people of African descent, then, not only
compromised the philosophical integrity of the Revolution and the
democratic political framework of the new government, but also
provided the basis for what subsequently proved an irreconcilable
conflict. Thus, upon reviewing events leading to the American Civil
War, one writer emphasized that "the same principles used to justify
the American Revolution, particularly John Locke's natural-rights
philsosophy, also condemned and doomed Negro slavery."' At the
height of that conflict, Abraham Lincoln reminded this nation, in his
1863 Gettysburg Address,' that the United States of America had
been "conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal ....[and] that this nation, under God, shall

have a new birth of freedom."' In 1865, the thirteenth amendment
ended chattel slavery;"' for black Americans, this represented an
initial step in the fulfillment of the libertarian goals of the
Revolution. Then, with passage of the fourteenth amendment in
1868, citizenship was granted to blacks, with the promise of equal
protection of the laws.' With the fifteenth amendment in 1870, a
constitutional guarantee that suffrage would not be denied because
of race, 3 the egalitarian goals of the American Revolution should
have been achieved, providing the nation with "a new birth of
freedom."'
Still, the acquisition of full freedom, liberty, and equality for
Afro-Americans remained an elusive dream. While slavery had
ended, racism persisted in American life, which not only nullified the
full expression of liberties by blacks, but also contributed to their
denial of equal protection of the laws. Since Reconstruction, 5
Afro-Americans have continued to press for freedom.
And,
298. L. LTWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860, at
6 (1961).
299. A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRrrANNicA 229 (15th ed. 1985).
300. Id. at para. 1-3.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
302. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
303. U.S. CoNST. amend. XV.
304. See A. Lincoln, supra note 299, at para. 1-3.
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paradoxically, within a century following the Civil War's end, one
scholar, while assessing the Civil Rights Movement,' responded to
the public outcry denouncing the strident militancy of Black Protest
in the 1960's by stating: "If his action is explosive, this is not merely
because of the world-wide equalitarian spirit of the present time
which he reflects and shares. It is also because he is working with
what has always been the one 'revolutionary' factor [the American
egalitarian faith] in the national history. " '
In the two centuries since the 1787 Constitution, then, it is not
enough to consider what the Revolutionary War generation thought
and did about slavery. Under American constitutional liberalism,
with its emphasis on legality, the issue of race needs explication as
well. As we have seen in the record of the American past only civil
war and civil upheaval have served to advance the cause of liberty
and equality for Afro-Americans. Thus, as we move into the third
century of our history under American constitutional liberalism, it is
important when we trace the rise of liberty, democracy, and the
expansion of equality in this nation, that we not forget the historic
persistence of racial oppression, social injustice, and economic
inequalities.
These powerful forces continue to pace our nation's history.
They also mark the limits to which the Constitution of 1787 and its
subsequent amendments have succeeded for Afro-Americans in
fulfilling the social contract and implementing the principles of
freedom, liberty, and equality on which this nation was founded.
But the measure of success for Afro-Americans will not be where
we stand in relation to our historic past. Rather, when the liberties,
freedoms, and economic opportunities for Afro-Americans are equal
to that of America's historically advantaged group, then the
American Revolution, with its egalitarian imperative, will be fulfilled
for Afro-Americans.
306. The Civil Rights Movement began in the late 1950's and continued powerfully into
the late 1960's until the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. brought on a general
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